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Abstract 
Organizations are increasingly engaging the community through crowdsourcing platforms to evolve 
innovative solutions to challenging business problems. Participants on such platforms often 
simultaneously cooperate and compete with one another to earn top honors. This paper addresses the 
imperative to understand the dynamics of knowledge sharing in such a coopetitive environment. 
Specifically, our study relies on the conceptual foundations of social exchange and social capital 
theories to investigate how help rendered (e.g., exchanging ideas or sharing knowledge) by 
participants in an online coopetitive crowdsourcing setting affects their performance. Furthermore, 
the study examines the moderating effects of the intensity of competition. Results of our 
econometrics analyses suggest that help given in a highly competitive contest, as opposed to a less 
competitive one, is more likely to be reciprocated, but less likely to improve the contributor’s contest 
performance. In addition, our study found that help received by participants positively impacts their 
contest performance, and partially mediates the relationship between help rendered and contest 
performance. This research also provides insight into what motivates participants to share knowledge 
under conditions of coopetition. The findings of our study have strong implications for both theory 
and practice. 
Keywords: Crowdsourcing, Online Communities, Contest-Based Communities, Knowledge 
Sharing, Social Exchange, Coopetitive Knowledge Sharing 
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1 Introduction 
At a time when information technology is growing at a 
phenomenal rate and product lifecycles are rapidly 
shrinking, organizations that fail to learn, adapt, and 
innovate are doomed to obscurity. Companies are 
continually striving to gain actionable insights that will 
help them stay ahead of their competition. However, the 
lack of in-house talent that is adequately trained in 
emerging technologies severely hampers their efforts. 
Furthermore, there is growing evidence to suggest that 
the “wisdom of crowds” can be exploited to evolve 
novel solutions to complex problems (for example, see 
Howard, 2010). Given this backdrop, it is not surprising 
that organizations and researchers seek new ideas and 
high-quality solutions to their real-world problems from 
crowdsourcing platforms. For example, ZTE 
crowdsourced its smartphone design (Lukyanenko et al., 
2017), and Lego has been able to create value by 
engaging its consumers in the design of their Lego sets 
(Kohler, 2015). A case study by Schlagwein and Bjorn-
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Andersen (2014) suggests that crowdsourcing also 
contributes to organizational learning.  
Formally, crowdsourcing refers to “a sourcing model in 
which organizations use predominately advanced 
internet technologies to harness the effort of the virtual 
crowd to perform specific organizational tasks” (Saxton 
& Kishore, 2013 p.3). According to Crowdsourcing.org, 
ten out of the eleven top global brands use 
crowdsourcing to seek innovative solutions to their 
business problems (Crowdsourcing.org, 2015). 
Furthermore, a survey conducted by the Marketing 
Executive Networking Group in 2009 found that 75% of 
company executives think crowdsourcing is highly 
effective for new product and service development 
(Sullivan, 2010). Examples of online platforms that 
facilitate crowdsourcing include Kaggle.com (for 
predictive modeling projects), IdeaStorm.com (for idea 
generation), and InnoCentive.com (for R&D).  
With the growing popularity of online communities 
(OCs), the topic of knowledge sharing among members 
of these communities has attracted increasing attention 
in the IS literature (e.g., Faraj, Kudaravalli, & Wasko, 
2015). Online communities not only provide a space for 
social interactions but also facilitate integration and 
knowledge sharing among geographically distributed 
individuals. Unlike in organizational settings, these 
collaborations tend to be self-organizing because of the 
voluntary and informal nature of interactions (Faraj et 
al., 2015). Crowdsourcing communities are similar to 
many of these online communities, for they are self-
organizing, involve voluntary participation, provide 
forums for active community engagement, and have 
members who share common interests. However, the 
competitive nature of crowdsourcing platforms 
differentiates them from other online communities 
(Füller et al., 2014). In a typical crowdsourcing contest, 
participants, often working in teams, compete with one 
another to evolve creative solutions to business 
problems posted by organizations and research 
institutions. Such contests are characterized by intense 
competition, as only the best solution is rewarded. 
Indeed, the members who participate in such 
crowdsourcing platforms, as opposed to many other 
online communities, may be motivated by the reward as 
well as the opportunity to enhance their reputations.  
Interestingly, crowdsourcing platforms generally 
facilitate interactions among competitors, allowing 
them to exchange ideas and share knowledge related to 
the contest. Thus, the social structure of coopetition 
underlying crowdsourcing platforms is akin to multiple 
units within organizations cooperating while 
simultaneously competing with one another for 
resources (for example, see Tsai, 2002). It is, therefore, 
reasonable to expect knowledge sharing in such 
coopetitive environments to have different 
consequences compared to online communities that are 
collaborative. The question then is: Why would 
participants jeopardize their chances of winning by 
sharing knowledge and ideas with competitors in an 
intensely competitive environment?  
It is apparent from the preceding discussions that the 
relationships between knowledge sharing (i.e., 
rendering and receiving help) and performance in a 
coopetitive setting are yet to be subjected to rigorous 
empirical scrutiny (for example, see (Hutter et al., 
2011). Researchers have viewed knowledge sharing 
behavior in online communities as a form of social 
exchange (e.g., Yan et al., 2016). The benefits (i.e., 
social capital) that members may gain by virtue of 
establishing structural ties with other participants 
(Nahapiet, 2008) may be yet another reason for 
knowledge sharing in coopetitive environments. 
Therefore, to fill the void in the literature, our study 
draws on the theoretical underpinnings of social 
exchange and social capital theories (Aronson, Wilson, 
& Akert, 2006; Blau, 1964) to explore the following 
research questions: 
1. How does the active engagement of participants in 
knowledge sharing—either in terms of rendering 
or receiving help—impact their performance? 
Furthermore, how does the type of knowledge 
being shared (e.g., procedural versus general 
inquiries) differentially affect performance? Are 
social exchanges in coopetitive crowdsourcing 
communities reciprocal? Specifically, do 
competitors who contribute more knowledge 
receive more help and perform better? In other 
words, does the extent of help received by 
participants mediate the relationship between the 
extent of help rendered and their performance? 
2. Competition makes crowdsourcing platforms 
such as Kaggle different from other online 
communities. How does the level of competition 
impact knowledge sharing behavior in 
crowdsourcing communities? Specifically, does 
the intensity of competition moderate the 
relationships between knowledge sharing and 
performance? 
Our study uses data from Kaggle.com, a crowdsourcing 
platform in which competition and cooperation among 
participants coexist, to explore the research questions. 
Thus, our study makes a unique contribution to both 
theory and practice by exploring knowledge sharing 
behaviors in a coopetitive environment. While prior 
empirical studies have focused on collaborative 
communities (Ardichvili, Page, & Wentling, 2003; 
Wasko & Faraj, 2005), ours is among the few that have 
examined help seeking and help providing in a 
crowdsourcing community characterized by the 
simultaneous presence of collaboration and competition 
(Füller et al., 2014; Hutter et al., 2011). Furthermore, our 
study reaffirms the findings of previous empirical works 
(e.g., Faraj et al., 2015) with regard to the positive 
influence of structural social capital (e.g., the indegree 
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and betweenness centrality of a social network) on 
performance. For example, our paper demonstrates that 
rendering help enhances one’s indegree and 
betweenness centrality, which, in turn, leads to superior 
performance. Our study also clarifies the types of 
knowledge shared, namely technical and context-
related, in a knowledge-intensive crowdsourcing 
context and investigates how each impacts performance. 
Finally, the insights provided by this study may be used 
by crowdsourcing platform designers to create a 
collaborative environment that motivates participants to 
actively contribute knowledge that will eventually lead 
to more innovative and effective solutions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
ensuing section provides a review of the pertinent 
literature, followed by an illustration of the research 
model and the hypotheses resulting from it. 
Subsequently, we describe the dataset and explain how 
the variables used in our study were operationalized. 
Next, we present our analysis and results, followed by a 
discussion of the implications of our findings. The 
concluding section sums up the paper and suggests 
directions for future research. 
2 Theoretical Background and 
Hypotheses 
2.1 Knowledge Sharing in Online and 
Crowdsourcing Communities  
An online community (OC) is a virtual space where 
people voluntarily come together and exchange 
resources and information (Faraj et al., 2016). 
Participants in these communities often share common 
interests and experiences. Such communities foster a 
climate of knowledge sharing because they are 
“boundaryless,” highly visible, and continually change 
as new members with diverse backgrounds and skillsets 
join them. In the special section introduction of “online 
communities as a space for knowledge sharing,” Faraj et 
al. offer the following definition: “OCs are collective 
spaces of knowledge flows characterized by a 
continuous morphing and are mutually constituted by 
digital technologies and participants” (Faraj et al., 2016, 
p.669). As mentioned earlier, a crowdsourcing 
community is a special type of online community that 
shares many similarities with other OCs, but the spirit of 
competition they instill in their members distinguishes 
them from other online communities investigated in 
prior studies (Bullinger et al., 2010). For example, OCs 
related to open-source software (OSS) development 
entail collective effort. In contrast, crowdsourcing 
largely relies on independent work (Seltzer, 2012). 
Paradoxically, crowdsourcing participants often 
voluntarily share their contest-related knowledge and 
ideas with other competitors while striving to develop 
the best solution. Crowdsourcing communities are also 
different from general OCs where members share 
information about common interests (e.g., travel, 
photograph, sports) and life experiences. Unlike 
crowdsourcing, members of general communities 
typically do not compete with one another for rewards. 
Crowdsourcing communities differ from professional 
communities as well. While members of a professional 
online community (e.g., the database community) may 
work for competing companies (e.g., Oracle and IBM), 
they do not compete for rewards as members of a 
crowdsourcing community do. Since competition 
among participants is peculiar to crowdsourcing 
communities, the motivations and consequences of 
rendering help to other members could be quite different 
from what we know about other OCs. Of particular 
interest in crowdsourcing settings is the question of 
whether the sharing of knowledge and ideas with rivals 
would diminish the contributor’s competitive 
advantage. It is therefore likely that the effects of 
helping behaviors in coopetitive crowdsourcing 
communities may be more complicated than in other 
online forums that have been studied so far. Previous 
literature on crowdsourcing is conspicuously lacking in 
this regard. 
Prior empirical studies on crowdsourcing contests have 
examined various factors that may influence outcomes, 
including output quality (Boudreau, Lacetera, & 
Lakhani, 2011), a solver’s project completion rate 
(Yang, Chen, & Pavlou, 2009), a solver’s probability of 
winning a contest (Mo, Zheng, & Geng, 2011; Yang, 
Chen, & Banker, 2010) and the number of participating 
solvers (Yang et al., 2009). It has also been 
demonstrated that contestants’ characteristics such as 
skills (Archak, 2010) and effort (Mo et al., 2011), 
contest reward structure (Archak, 2010), and the total 
number of solvers (Archak, 2010; Boudreau et al., 2011) 
influence a solver’s contest performance and the chance 
of winning. Füller et al. (2014) explored the 
heterogeneity of participants in a crowdsourcing context 
and its relationship to quality and type of contributions. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the dynamics of 
knowledge and information sharing in crowdsourcing 
communities and its impacts have not been rigorously 
examined in empirical studies. 
Prior research on OCs has primarily examined 
knowledge sharing behavior in cooperative 
environments. While many of the studies conducted so 
far have investigated the antecedents (e.g., motivations 
or intentions) of knowledge sharing, very few have 
empirically examined the consequences (e.g., benefits) 
of sharing (i.e., using knowledge sharing as an 
independent variable) in OCs. For instance, Huang and 
Zhang (2016) showed that contribution in a knowledge 
community results in job-hopping. Table 1 compares a 
sample of related studies on online knowledge 
collaboration published in premier IS journals.
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Bateman, Gray, & Butler (2011) ☐   ☐ ☐ 
Chen & Huang (2010) ☐   ☐ ☐ 
Chiu, Hsu, & Wang (2006) ☐   ☐ ☐ 
Chang & Chuang (2011) ☐   ☐ ☐ 
Faraj et al. (2015)  ☐  ☐ ☐ 
Füller et al. (2014) ☐  ☐ ☐  
Huang & Zhang (2016)   ☐  ☐ ☐ 
Hutter et al. (2011) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  
Wasko & Faraj (2005) ☐   ☐ ☐ 
Tsai & Bagozzi (2014) ☐   ☐ ☐ 
Our study  ☐ ☐ ☐  
Notes:  represents “applied” or “considered.”   represents “not applied” or “not considered.” 
Although the focus of this study is on the dynamics of 
knowledge sharing in a coopetitive crowdsourcing 
environment, we used text modeling to get a sense of 
how empirical studies have used knowledge sharing in 
other contexts, such as online forums, virtual 
communities, and open source software development.  
Specifically, we used relevant search terms to extract 
abstracts from the Web of Science (WOS) database. It 
must be noted that the search terms1 were motivated by 
the need to retrieve articles on knowledge sharing in 
specific contexts (online communities, competitions, 
and software development). A total of 245 abstracts 
were downloaded from WOS. While there are many 
ways to perform topic modeling (e.g., non-negative 
matrix factorization, latent semantic analysis/indexing, 
and latent Dirichlet allocation or LDA), we chose LDA 
because of its popularity (for example, see Debortoli e 
 
1 TOPIC: (“knowledge sharing” and “open source software”) 
or (“knowledge exchange” and “open source software”) or 
(“knowledge sharing” and “software development”) or 
(“knowledge exchange” and “software development”) or 
(“knowledge sharing” and “competition”) or (“knowledge 
exchange" and "competition") or (“knowledge sharing” and 
"virtual communities") or (“collaboration” and “virtual 
communities") or (“knowledge sharing” and “online 
community"). 
al., 2016). The interested reader may refer to Debortoli 
et al. (2016) and Blei (2012) for details of LDA. 
The downloaded abstracts were preprocessed before 
they were analyzed. Preprocessing included 
normalizing the text and removing stopwords, 
punctuation and digits. Ldatuning,2 a package for tuning 
LDA model parameters in R, identifies the optimum 
number of topics using different algorithms. After 
considering the suggestions of several models and 
manually examining different numbers of topics, we 
found 20 topics that were reasonably interpretable. 
Topics were generated using the LDA implementation 
in a popular toolkit called MALLET (machine learning 
for language toolkit).3 A summary of the 20 topics that 
we extracted using LDA is shown in Table A (see 
Appendix A). It is apparent from the table that 
knowledge sharing has been investigated in a variety of 
contexts, including supply chain, open source software 
development, healthcare, social media, customer co-
Refined by: WEB OF SCIENCE CATEGORIES: 
(MANAGEMENT OR COMPUTER SCIENCE 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS OR BUSINESS OR 
OPERATIONS RESEARCH MANAGEMENT SCIENCE) 
AND DOCUMENT TYPES: (ARTICLE OR REVIEW) 
Timespan: 1900-2016. Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, 
A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, ESCI. 
2  See https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/ldatuning/ 
ldatuning.pdf 
3 See http://mallet.cs.umass.edu/ 
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creation, and other virtual communities; however, a 
majority of these studies were conducted in 
collaborative or noncompetitive environments. There is 
a paucity of studies that have investigated competitive 
environments, and the examination of coopetitive 
knowledge sharing is mainly limited to 
interorganizational settings. Furthermore, the results 
appear to support our claim that prior studies mainly 
focused on the motives or intention behind knowledge 
sharing rather than on the realized consequences or 
benefits. 
Prior studies on collaborative, noncompetitive 
communities have demonstrated that helping others 
often leads to several benefits, including reciprocal 
benefits (Kankanhalli, Tan, & Wei, 2005), reputational 
and learning benefits (Chen, Xu, & Whinston, 2011; 
Khansa et al. 2015; Sproull, Conley, & Moon, 2005), 
improved professional status, increased number of 
professional contacts, enhanced self-image, access to 
expert advice, and an increased level of confidence in 
one’s knowledge (Bateman et al., 2011). However, as 
mentioned earlier, competition and cooperation are 
simultaneously present in crowdsourcing contests. In 
some crowdsourcing competitions, solvers help each 
other through sharing information and knowledge 
(cooperation), while competing with one another for a 
monetary reward (competition). Therefore, the 
benefits that accrue to a contributor by virtue of 
helping others in such coopetitive environments may 
be different from the advantages that one may get by 
rendering assistance in other communities. To further 
understand knowledge sharing behavior in coopetitive 
environments, we examine coopetitive knowledge 
sharing literature in other domains.  
2.2 Coopetitive Knowledge Sharing 
Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996) originally 
introduced the concept of “coopetition,” which refers 
to being simultaneously involved in both competitive 
and cooperative activities. Coopetitive knowledge 
sharing is extensively studied and applied at an 
organizational level in many industry sectors such as 
high-tech industries, healthcare, automotive, air 
transport, and food (Ritala, 2012). Coopetitive 
knowledge sharing has spawned several breakthroughs 
and generated many benefits for organizations. An oft-
cited success story is the coopetition between Samsung 
Electronics and Sony Corporation to develop LCD TV 
panels (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). This challenges the 
traditional view that a pure structure—competitive or 
cooperative—is superior to hybrid structures (Ghobadi 
& D’Ambra, 2011). 
Research studies have identified many benefits and 
risks associated with knowledge sharing in coopetitive 
environments. On the one hand, reciprocal knowledge 
sharing could result in synergetic effects and benefit all 
parties involved in knowledge sharing activities. On 
the other, knowledge spillover and opportunistic 
behaviors of knowledge receivers could negatively 
impact knowledge contributors (Ilvonen & Vuori, 
2013). Carayannis & Alexander (1999) viewed 
knowledge sharing as a positive-sum game. 
Prior studies have indicated that coopetition is 
particularly important for knowledge-intensive, highly 
complex, and dynamic networks (Carayannis & 
Alexander, 1999). Crowdsourcing competitions 
networks are very dynamic in nature. The exit or entry 
barriers in such contests is low. Specifically, the 
platform that we selected is characterized by 
knowledge-intensive and complex tasks. In this study, 
we attempt to extend the literature on coopetition by 
understanding how it can be applied beyond inter- and 
intraorganizational networks to online crowdsourcing 
competitions.  
2.3 Impact of Social Exchanges (Helping 
Behavior) 
In a crowdsourcing community, a competitor can 
request help from other solvers by posting a message 
in an open forum. Participants often use these forums 
to share ideas with and render help to competitors who 
seek answers to specific contest-related questions. 
Such helping behavior is regarded as a form of 
generalized social exchange involving multiple 
participants (Fulk, Flanagin, Kalman, Monge, & Ryan, 
1996), and its effects can be explained using multiple 
theoretical lenses, such as social capital theory and 
social exchange theory (Kankanhalli et al., 2005). 
Specifically, social exchange theory has been applied 
to investigate knowledge contribution and knowledge-
seeking behaviors in online communities (Phang, 
Kankanhalli, & Sabherwal, 2009). Unlike in economic 
exchanges, obligations in social exchanges are not 
clearly specified (Blau, 1964). In social exchanges, 
people render favors with general expectations of 
gratitude and a possible return of the favor; however, 
such reciprocity is not guaranteed. This is what occurs 
in online crowdsourcing communities. In these 
communities, solvers voluntarily help peers by 
answering questions—through messages that they post 
in community forums—without specific expectations 
of future returns. According to social exchange theory, 
prosocial behavior of this nature can be rewarding in 
three ways: (1) By enhancing the likelihood of 
receiving help in the future (i.e., reciprocity), (2) by 
reducing personal distress of the contributor, and (3) 
by gaining social approval and enhancing self-worth 
(Aronson et al., 2006). 
Consistent with social exchange theory, there is ample 
evidence of the benefits that accrue to contributors who 
exhibit prosocial behavior. For instance, empirical 
studies in management and organizational behavior 
have found that such helping behavior may increase 
employees’ psychological well-being, protect them 
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from emotional exhaustion, and help them increase 
performance, persistence, and productivity (Grant, 
2008; Grant & Sonnentag, 2010). Psychological 
research shows that when driven by intentions to help 
others, people come up with novel and useful ideas, 
thereby resulting in more creative performance 
(Forgeard & Mecklenburg, 2013; Grant & Berry, 
2011). Also, helping behavior has been found to 
energize people by satisfying their fundamental 
psychological needs for competence, relatedness, and 
autonomy (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). Based on these 
insights, we expect crowdsourcing solvers’ helping 
behavior to enhance their creativity and work 
effectiveness, thereby enhancing their performance in 
contests. 
In addition, according to social exchange theory, 
helping behavior leads to reciprocal benefits and 
increase the chances of receiving help from peers in the 
future (Aronson et al., 2006; Kankanhalli et al., 2005). 
Both direct and indirect reciprocity could result from 
these social exchanges. Direct reciprocity occurs when 
one’s help is directly reciprocated by the recipient, 
while indirect reciprocity means one’s giving is 
indirectly reciprocated by a third party. Prior studies 
have identified several reasons for indirect social 
exchanges in online communities, namely, distributed 
knowledge and uneven expertise, visibility, and social 
solidarity and norms (Faraj & Johnson, 2011). 
Furthermore, helping behavior contributes to the 
development of trusting and high-quality relationships 
(Ozer, 2011) and increases the social status of the 
helper (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). These, in turn, may 
lead to high-quality intellectual exchanges between 
contributors and their peers (Chen & Hung, 2010; Chiu 
et al., 2006). People who render help to others build 
both a good reputation and social capital, which further 
contributes to their success (Grant, 2013). 
There are two features of social exchanges—
appropriability and generalized reciprocity—that can 
be used to explain how help received improves the 
contributor’s performance through enhancing the 
social capital of the contributor. Appropriability refers 
to the usefulness of social ties beyond the purpose for 
which they were originally created (Huang & Zhang, 
2016). Consider, for example, a neighborhood safety 
patrol comprising members from the community. 
Although the social ties among these members were 
established for the sole purpose of keeping the 
neighborhood safe, these connections may be 
beneficial to members in different circumstances (e.g., 
getting their personal computers fixed or finding a 
good person to mend their fence). Generalized 
reciprocity refers to help being rendered without any 
expectation of an immediate return, anticipating 
perhaps that the favor will be returned at a later date 
(Nahapiet, 2008). Solvers can save considerable time 
and energy by soliciting help when they experience 
technical difficulties. This would enable them to 
devote their valuable time to develop superior 
solutions to the problem. In addition, the varied 
background of the competitors may provide insights 
that would otherwise not be available to those seeking 
help. 
While helping peers leads to performance and 
reciprocal benefits, social exchange theory suggests 
that providers of help incur certain actual and 
opportunity costs. Helping rivals by sharing 
knowledge and information in competitive 
environments may be more generate costs because of 
knowledge spillover. For instance, the study by 
Ghobadi and D’Ambra (2011) on knowledge sharing 
in organizational settings showed that the contributor 
might experience “negative reverse impact” (i.e., 
competitors can also use that knowledge), which 
diminishes the value of knowledge to the contributor. 
However, regardless of these costs, people may be 
inclined to share knowledge in high-profile 
competitive environments, such as Kaggle, because of 
their desire to express themselves and be identified as 
valuable members of the community (e.g., Cyr & 
Choo, 2010). Constant, Kiesler, and Sproull (1994, p. 
400) note that, “sharing expertise may depend on 
people’s own self-expressive needs.” Furthermore, 
they observe that, “expertise contributes to a person's 
self-identity, and that sharing expertise allows for 
personal benefits arising from self-expression and self-
consistency” (p. 412). 
As illustrated earlier, crowdsourcing contests exhibit 
characteristics of a coopetitive environment. Thus, 
competitors in crowdsourcing contests could incur 
costs when they render help to others. For instance, not 
only do contributors have to expend time and effort to 
share relevant knowledge, but their sharing of know-
how could also reduce their competitive advantage. 
Opportunity costs are incurred because of the loss of 
time and effort (Kankanhalli et al., 2005) that could 
have otherwise been used to improve their own 
solutions. It is also reasonable to expect that both the 
costs of helping others in contest-based communities 
and the attendant benefits are contingent on the level 
of competition (i.e., competitive intensity). 
In light of the preceding discussions, we identify two 
main effects of a contributor’s helping behavior: (1) 
help given influences the contributor’s performance, 
and (2) help given influences the help received by the 
contributor. Motivated by the works of Wasko & Faraj 
(2005) and Chiu et al. (2006), we distinguished 
between the quantity and quality of help. Help given in 
this context refers to the quantity and quality of 
answers given by a solver when others raise questions 
related to the contest. Help received refers to quantity 
and quality of answers received from others when a 
solver poses a question. Wasko and Faraj’s 
conceptualization of the knowledge contribution 
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comprises both helpfulness (analogous to quality in 
our case) and volume (i.e., quantity) of contributions 
based on users’ message postings. In our study, 
quantity represents how often users engage in 
knowledge sharing activities, while quality represents 
the value of the knowledge shared, as measured by the 
number of votes that a message receives. Performance 
refers to the relative quality of a solver’s solutions. 
Given these arguments, we propose that: (1) help given 
by competitors in a crowdsourcing community is 
positively related to their contest performance (H1) as 
well as to the help received by them (H2), and (2) help 
received by competitors is positively related to their 
contest performance (H3). Furthermore, we 
hypothesize that the competitive intensity of a contest 
moderates the relationship between (1) help given and 
contest performance (H4), and (2) help given and help 
received (H5). Figure 1 summarizes the research 
model.
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
Crowdsourcing tasks are often knowledge intensive 
and intellectually demanding. The success of these 
projects depends on the skills and creativity of solvers. 
Even though helping others in crowdsourcing is not a 
required aspect of task performance, doing so may 
enhance an individual’s cognitive processing and 
ability to generate creative ideas “by increasing 
persistence and vigor for the task at hand” (Forgeard & 
Mecklenburg, 2013, p. 262). Helping others encourages 
individuals to spend more time and energy on a task, 
which eventually enhances their performance by 
increasing creativity and effectiveness (Grant, 2008). 
Engaging in knowledge and information sharing 
through answering questions may also help solvers feel 
more confident about their own knowledge and reduce 
their stress levels. As a consequence, they might persist 
and perform better on their tasks (Bateman et al., 2011; 
Grant & Sonnentag, 2010; Xu, Jones, & Shao, 2009). 
Moreover, those engaged in prosocial help-giving 
behaviors may engage in “perspective-taking” 
(Forgeard & Mecklenburg, 2013) or the ability to 
objectively understand the needs and aspirations of 
those seeking assistance. This, in turn, enables them to 
widen their perspectives and potentially come up with 
more creative solutions. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: Help given by competitors in a crowdsourcing 
community is positively related to their contest 
performance. 
H1a: The quantity of help given by competitors in a 
crowdsourcing community is positively related 
to their contest performance. 
H1b: The quality of help given by competitors in a 
crowdsourcing community is positively related 
to their contest performance. 
As per social exchange theory, contributors are likely 
to receive direct or indirect reciprocal benefits from 
others over time (Chen & Hung, 2010; Flynn, 2003). 
In our context, this suggests that help rendered by 
competitors would increase their likelihood of 
receiving help from their peers in the future (Aronson 
et al., 2006; Kankanhalli et al., 2005). Specifically, 
there are several situational factors that facilitate 
reciprocal behaviors in crowdsourcing competitions. 
First, unlike in organizational settings, there are no 
defined roles or expertise for the job. Any individual 
can participate in these competitions irrespective of 
their skills or expertise. Thus, there is likely to be a 
Help Given 
 
 –Quantity help given 
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huge variance in the knowledge and expertise among 
these participants. Second, the reciprocal benefit of 
prosocial behavior is particularly salient when helpful 
response is visible to the public. In the crowdsourcing 
context, solvers help each other by asking and 
answering questions and posting messages in 
discussion forums that are open to the public. The high 
visibility of these social exchanges suggests that help 
given is likely to result in an increase in help received. 
Third, help given could also enhance a solver’s social 
status/technical reputation, thus enabling them to grow 
their social network (Flynn, 2003). All these 
situational factors enhance the likelihood that the other 
solvers in the community would directly or indirectly 
reciprocate the help that they received. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
H2: Help given is positively related to help received in 
a contest. 
H2a: The quantity of help given is positively related to 
help received in a contest. 
H2b: The quality of help given is positively related to 
help received in a contest. 
Crowdsourcing contests, such as the ones on Kaggle, 
require a deep understanding of machine learning, 
predictive analytics, statistics, mathematics, and 
programming. In addition, they are knowledge 
intensive, often necessitating an integration of diverse 
pieces of information to evolve an innovative and 
effective solution to the problem at hand. It is 
reasonable to assume that participants who seek 
specific help are trying to fill crucial gaps in the 
knowledge that they need to develop an effective 
solution. According to Newell and Simon’s (1972) 
theory of human problem solving, solvers navigate a 
potentially large search space as they evaluate 
solutions that reliably map on to the problem space 
being addressed. The availability of pertinent 
knowledge, such as “know-how,” algorithms, and 
heuristics, facilitates the search process and enables 
participants to evolve an efficacious solution (for 
example, see Mangalaraj et al., 2014). Therefore, while 
the help rendered (i.e., posts) is available to all 
participants, including lurkers who don’t engage in 
knowledge sharing/receiving, the ones who benefit the 
most are likely to be those who sought help to get their 
specific technical questions answered. Also, the time 
and effort they save can be directed toward improving 
their own solutions.  
Terwiesch & Xu (2008) showed that one of the 
advantages of crowdsourcing is that it yields a very 
diverse set of solutions. Prior studies have shown that 
different points of view expressed by people from 
diverse backgrounds lead to new insights and ideas that 
foster creativity (Fischer, Scharff, & Ye, 2004). Thus, 
we hypothesize: 
H3: Help received by competitors in a crowdsourcing 
community is positively related to their contest 
performance. 
Prior studies have noted that “giving away knowledge 
eventually causes the possessor to lose his or her 
unique value relative to what others know” (Wasko & 
Faraj, 2005, p. 38). Since both competition and 
cooperation coexist in crowdsourcing communities, 
sharing can diminish the value of knowledge and blunt 
the competitive edge of competitors who render help 
(Ghobadi & D’Ambra, 2011). This represents the cost 
factor of social exchanges in contest-based 
communities. Such a phenomenon could be even more 
apparent in a highly competitive contest in which a 
large number of teams with similar levels of skills (i.e., 
low skill distribution) compete with one another. 
Sharing knowledge in a highly competitive 
environment is more likely to result in knowledge 
spillover. In addition, competitors incur higher 
opportunity costs when they spend time and effort in 
helping others in a contest where the intensity of 
competition is very high. Thus, we hypothesize:  
H4: Competitive intensity negatively moderates the 
relationship between help given and contest 
performance such that the effect of help given on 
contest performance is less positive in highly 
competitive contests than in less competitive 
contests. 
H4a: Competitive intensity negatively moderates the 
relationship between quantity of help given and 
contest performance such that the effect of 
quantity of help given on contest performance is 
less positive in highly competitive contests than 
in less competitive contests. 
H4b: Competitive intensity negatively moderates the 
relationship between quality of help given and 
contest performance such that the effect of 
quality of help given on contest performance is 
less positive in highly competitive contests than 
in less competitive contests. 
However, the help that solvers render in highly 
competitive contests is more likely to be reciprocated 
than in contests where the intensity of competition is 
low. In such circumstances, not only will the 
knowledge shared benefit a larger number of 
participants but it will also be more visible. In an 
intense competition where specialized knowledge can 
make a difference, solvers are more likely to 
understand and appreciate the risk that was taken by 
those who share knowledge. Hence, help given in 
highly competitive contests is more likely to be 
recognized by the community and will thus enhance 
the probability of receiving help. Furthermore, in 
highly competitive contests, solvers are more likely to 
have comparable skills (Dissanayake, Zhang, & Gu, 
2015) and will thus be more likely to understand and 
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appreciate the knowledge and information shared. In 
contrast, in less competitive contests, solvers’ skill 
distribution would be skewed, and it is likely that some 
solvers with low skill levels will have difficulty 
assimilating the knowledge shared because low skill 
levels act as a barrier (e.g., low absorptive capacity) to 
the reception of knowledge (Paulin & Suneson, 2012). 
Hence, help given in highly competitive contests is 
more likely to result in reciprocal benefits than in less 
competitive contests. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H5: Competitive intensity positively moderates the 
relationship between help given and help 
received such that the effect of help given on help 
received is more positive in highly competitive 
contests than in less competitive contests. 
H5a: Competitive intensity positively moderates the 
relationship between the quantity of help given 
and help received such that the effect of quantity 
of help given on help received is more positive 
in highly competitive contests than in less 
competitive contests. 
H5b: Competitive intensity positively moderates the 
relationship between quality of help given and 
help received such that the effect of quality of 
help given on help received is more positive in 
highly competitive contests than in less 
competitive contests. 
3 Data 
We used data4 from Kaggle.com, a specialized crowd-
sourcing community that mainly deals with predictive 
modeling tasks. It has a member base of more than 
100,000 data scientists from all over the world. Since 
its launch in 2010, Kaggle has worked with many 
companies, including Walmart, Allstate, Expedia, and 
Mercedes-Benz, to run analytics competitions to seek 
the best predictive models for a variety of problems, 
such as improving sales forecasting, predicting 
customer choices, optimizing search processes, and 
accelerating product testing (Kaggle.com; 
Dissanayake et al., 2015; Dissanayake et al., 2018).  
Companies, government agencies, and researchers 
provide Kaggle with datasets, a description of the 
problem to be solved, and the reward they are willing 
to pay. Then, Kaggle sets up contests (Dissanayake et 
al., 2015). Each solver or team can submit multiple 
solutions throughout the contest. Kaggle evaluates all 
submissions and provides solvers instant feedback 
through a live scorecard, which gives solvers 
information on the predictive accuracy of their models 
and their relative positions (i.e., rank) in the contest. 
Kaggle’s website features an online profile of each 
 
4 Kaggle’s public data: https://www.kaggle.com/kaggle/ 
meta-kaggle 
solver, which shows a solver’s personal information 
and overall performance score based on rankings in the 
contests in which they have participated.  
In addition, each contest has a forum where solvers can 
initiate or participate in multiple discussion threads on 
various topics. When a solver needs help, they can 
initiate a thread by posting the question (initial post). 
Then, other participants voluntarily respond to the 
question by creating multiple posts (Figure 2). This is 
the main avenue for sharing knowledge in order to help 
others. Figure 3 shows a screenshot of a thread of 
topics from a forum. The helpfulness of a post may be 
assessed by the number of votes it receives from 
solvers. Thus, the number of votes that a post receives 
reflects its quality. Kaggle also reports the number of 
replies received by each thread topic. The total number 
of votes that a post has received is displayed below the 
post. Figure 4 shows a screenshot of an initial post on 
a discussion thread that solicits help from other 
participants. 
3.1 Measurement 
Help given refers to total forum posts made by a solver 
in response to help sought through a thread initiated by 
his or her peers in a given context (Figure 5). Help 
given was assessed in terms of the quantity of help 
given and the quality of help given. Following prior 
empirical studies, we used the number of posts as the 
quantity of help given and the votes received for those 
posts as the quality of help given. For example, Chiu et 
al. (2006) used average volume of posts as a measure 
of the quantity of knowledge shared. Sproull et al. 
(2005) used the identified “message” as the basic unit 
of contribution and measured “active participation” by 
the number of posts. Bateman et al., (2011) used the 
number of replies posted as a measurement of 
community participation, while Tsai & Bagozzi, 
(2014) used the number of messages posted to measure 
quantity contribution. Chen et al. (2014) used data 
from four online news communities to investigate the 
impact that feedback on users’ posts has on their 
subsequent behaviors. Feedback was measured in 
terms of the number of likes or votes that a post 
received from other community members, and the 
proportion of up-votes was used as a measure of the 
quality of a post. 
Help received is based on total forum replies received 
by a solver who posts a question and initiates a forum 
thread in a given contest (Figure 5). While considering 
replies received, we eliminated all subsequent posts 
made by the solver who posed the question (i.e., the 
thread initiator), including further clarifications and 
thank you notes to the respondents. Since the quantity 
and quality of help received are likely to be influenced 
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by help given, we used principal component analysis 
(PCA) to derive help received based on the total 
number of replies as well as the total number of votes 
received for those replies. In addition, we separately 
investigated the impact using the total number of 
replies received as a measure of quantity of help 
received and the total number of votes received as a 
measure of quality of help received. These results are 
reported in the section on robustness tests. 
Contest performance refers to the performance score 
of a solver in a given contest. Based on each solver’s 
performance and on the characteristics of the contest, 
Kaggle computes the performance score. Specifically, 
the characteristics of the contest include its level of 
difficulty and the total number of participants. 
According to Kaggle, “the current formula for each 
competition splits the points among the team members, 
decays the points for lower finishes, and adjusts for the 
number of teams that entered the competition.”5 
Competitive intensity: Following Dissanayake et al. 
(2015), we used the Herfindahl index (HHI) to 
measure the level of competition in a contest. It has 
been commonly used to measure market concentration 
in the economics literature. A higher HHI indicates a 
higher degree of market concentration and a lower 
level of competition. In our context, HHI measures the 
concentration of teams’ intellectual capital6 within a 
contest, and competitive intensity was determined 
using Equation (1): 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 = 1 −  𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗  =  







2   
(1) 
where i, j, and n denote team, contests, and the total 
number of teams participating in the contest, 
respectively. HHI measures the level of a team’s skill 
in relation to the contest and indicates the extent of 
competition among participating teams. The 
competitive intensity (i.e., (1 - HHI)) increases when 
more teams are involved and participants have 
comparable skills, whereas it goes down when the skill 
distribution of participants is more diverse.
 
 
Figure 2. Forum Tree Diagram 
 
5  Kaggle user ranking and tier system is available at 
https://www.kaggle.com/wiki/UserRankingAndTierSystem. 
6  We used the formula given by Kaggle to calculate the 
intellectual capital of a team given a contest. 
Figure 2: Forum Tree Diagram  




Figure 3. Screenshot of Thread Topics in a Contest Forum (Source: Kaggle.com) 
 
 
Figure 4. Screenshot of a Question Post on a Thread (source: kaggle.com) 
 
Figure 5. Help Given and Help Received 
Posts Thread Topics Forum 
Threads initiated by 





Threads initiated by 
peers of user i asking 
questions 
Replies given by user i 
--(Quantity of Help Given) 
Votes received to those replies 
--(Quality of Help Given) 
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3.2 Control Variables 
We used fixed effects to control for contest-specific 
effects. Moreover, we controlled for a solver’s domain 
expertise or skill score, tenure, and the number of 
submissions of the solver in each contest. Solver skill 
score (i.e., skill) refers to a solver’s profile score. This 
score reflects domain expertise and is derived based on 
one’s cumulative performance in Kaggle competitions. 
The platform considers factors such as solvers’ final 
ranking in each competition, the number of teams that 
participated, the number of members in the team, and 
the timing of the competition when calculating the 
score. The profile score was log-transformed to 
account for scaling effects. Prior literature in 
crowdsourcing has shown that solver skill positively 
influences their performance (Archak, 2010; 
Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). Hence, we used solver skill to 
control for the fact that their performance and 
recognition are affected by their domain expertise. 
Moreover, prior studies in online communities have 
identified tenure as a significant driver of knowledge 
contribution (Ma & Agarwal, 2007). It is also 
conceivable that high tenure individuals may receive 
more help by virtue of being well known in the 
community. In light of this, we added tenure as a 
control variable. Solver tenure in years was 
dynamically calculated by taking the difference 
between the date a solver registered with the platform 
and the contest start date. Tenure was regarded as 0 if 
the solver registered after the contest start date. The 
number of submissions (i.e., submission) refers to the 
number of solutions a solver submitted in a given 
contest. Previous studies have indicated that the 
number of submissions affects performance (Mo et al., 
2011).  
We also entered a lagged dependent variable—
Performance(k-1)—in the regressions to control for 
persistency. This is the solver’s performance score 
from his or her previous contest. For most solvers, 
performance in contests could be correlated due to 
factors such as work ethic, abilities, and other 
unobservable traits (Dissanayake et al., 2018). If a 
solver performed well in a previous contest, it is likely 
that he or she would perform well in the current time 
period as well. Thus, the lagged dependent variable can 
account for these individual-level effects. In addition, 
this also helps to control for the fact that high 
performing solvers may contribute more knowledge.7 
We collected information on 18612 solvers and their 
related 130 contests. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, 
respectively.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Performance 166.17 435.03 1.17 10294.20 
Help given (# posts) 0.44 2.41 0 123.00 
Help given (# votes) 0.22 1.70 0 55 
Help received (# posts) 0.55 4.35 0 231 
Help received (# votes) 0.33 4.11 0 243 
Submissions 11.78 20.15 1 965 
Skill 6.44 2.24 0 12.32 
# contests participated 1.70 2.28 1 57 
Tenure (yr.) 0.55 0.83 0 4 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Contest performance 1.0000        
2 Quantity help given 0.1220 1.0000       
3 Quality help given 0.1603 0.5629 1.0000      
4 Quantity help received 0.0852 0.4648 0.2509 1.0000     
5 Quality help received 0.0585 0.2349 0.2186 0.7138 1.0000    
6 Submissions 0.1509 0.2033 0.1800 0.1236 0.1003 1.0000   
7 Skill 0.1394 0.1620 0.1666 0.1103 0.0920 0.2549 1.0000  
8 Tenure 0.0498 0.0778 0.1013 0.0591 0.0605 0.1064 0.4333 1.0000 
 
7 We also tested the main models by controlling for the initial 
value of performance. The results were almost identical. 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
79 
4 Regression Models and 
Estimation Results 
We estimated the model coefficient using seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) analysis. The SUR corrects 
for any cross-equation error correlations that might be 
present. Furthermore, we controlled for contest-
specific characteristics using a fixed-effects model. In 
the robustness test section, we also reported results 
with individual-fixed effects to control for solvers’ 
heterogeneity. 
4.1 Impact of Help Given on 
Performance and Help Received 
First, we investigated how a solver’s helping behavior 
influences his or her performance and the likelihood of 
his or her receiving help. Equations (2) and (3) 
describe the regression model: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑘   = 𝛼10 + 𝛼11 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘  +
𝛼12𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑘 +  
 𝛼13𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼14𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑘 +
𝛼15𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖(𝑘−1) + 𝛼16𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑘 +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡1𝑗 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑘                                                     (2) 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑘   = 𝛼20+ 𝛼21 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘 +
 𝛼22𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼23𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖(𝑘−1) +
𝛼24𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑘 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡2𝑗 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑘                                    (3) 
where 𝛼1𝑚(𝑚 = 0 … 6) in Equation (2) and 𝛼2𝑚(𝑚 =
0 … 4) in Equation (3) represents the coefficients of the 
variables, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡1,2𝑗  is the coefficient for the fixed 
effects of the contest j, and j represents the kth contest 
that solver i has participated in.  
Table 4a summarizes the effect of the quantity of help 
given on performance and help received. Model 2 
controls for persistency of performance and eliminates 
observations with no prior competition details, thus 
making the sample size of Model 2 smaller than Model 
1. Both Model 1 (α21 = 0.20, p < 0.01) and Model 2 (α21 
= 0.21, p < 0.01) show that help given has a positive 
and significant impact on help received. Thus, H2a is 
supported, suggesting that help given enhances the 
probability of receiving help from others. The effect of 
help given on contest performance is significant in 
both Model 1 (α11 = 9.51, p < 0.01) and Model 2 (α11 = 
7.82, p < 0.01). Thus, H1a is supported. Consistent 
with H3a, help received has a positive and significant 
impact on performance in both Model 1 (α12 = 8.00, p 
< 0.01) and Model 2 (α12 = 7.03, p < 0.01). The Sobel-
Goodman mediation test confirmed that help received 
acts as a partial mediator. The proportion of the direct 
effect of quantity help given that is mediated through 
help received is 12%. 
Table 4b shows the effect of the quality of help given 
on performance and the likelihood of receiving help 
from peers. Model 2 controls for persistency of 
performance. Both Model 1 (α21 = 0.18, p < 0.01) and 
Model 2 (α21 = 0.18, p < 0.01) shows that help given 
has a positive and significant impact on help received. 
Thus, H2b is supported. The effect of the quality of 
help given on contest performance is positive and 
significant in both Model 1 (α11 = 30.42, p < 0.001) and 
Model 2 (α11 = 28.94, p < 0.01). Thus, H1b is 
supported. Help received has a positive and significant 
impact on performance in both Model 1 (α12 = 5.23, p 
< 0.01) and Model 2 (α12 = 3.03, p < 0.1). Thus, H3b is 
supported. In addition, we tested whether help received 
mediates the relationship between the quality of help 
given and performance. The Sobel-Goodman 
mediation test confirmed that help received acts as a 
partial mediator. The proportion of the direct effect of 
the quality that is mediated through help received is 
6%. This shows that both quality and quantity of help 
given result in performance and reciprocal benefits to 
the contributor in general. We also explored how help 
given enhances the contributors’ performance through 
strengthening their help-seeking network. These 
results are discussed in the additional analysis section. 
 
Table 4a. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results for Help Quantity 
DV 
Help received Contest performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Help given (quantity) 0.1993 ***   0.2107 ***  9.5098 ***  7.8199 *** 
Help received    8.0012 ***  7.0292 *** 
Contest performance(k-1)  -0.0000   0.0704 *** 
Submissions    2.3935 ***  2.5926 *** 
Skill 0.0258 ***  0.0418 *** 37.7791 *** 41.4180 *** 
Tenure 0.0260 ***  0.0291 -4.7215 * 12.3008 *** 
Observations 31693 13082 31693 13082 
R-squared 0.1460 0.1375 0.4326 0.4534 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 4b. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results for Help Quality 
DV 
Help received Contest performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Help given (quality) 0.1838 ***  0.1829 *** 30.4175 *** 28.9381 *** 
Help received    5.2325 ***  3.0296 * 
Contest performance(k-1)  0.0000   0.0662 *** 
Submissions    2.2338 ***  2.3531 *** 
Skill 0.0439 *** 0.0655 *** 36.3046 *** 38.4803 *** 
Tenure 0.0286 *** 0.0349 * -6.1257 ** 11.4071 *** 
Sample size 31693 13082 31693 13082 
R-squared 0.0726 0.0721 0.4430 0.4686 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
4.2 Moderating Effects of Competitive 
Intensity 
Prior literature has shown that help given leads to 
benefits (performance, reciprocal benefits) in 
collaborative communities (Xu et al., 2009). However, 
competition is unique to contest-based communities. 
Thus, we further investigated how competitive 
intensity affects these relationships. Equations (4) and 
(5) describe the regression model: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑘   = 𝛼10 + 𝛼11 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘  +
𝛼12𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑘 +  
𝛼13 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 +
𝛼14𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 +  𝛼15𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖 +
𝛼16𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑘 + 𝛼17𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖(𝑘−1) +
 𝛼17𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑘 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡1𝑗 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑘                                   (4) 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑘   = 𝛼20 +  𝛼21 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘 + 
𝛼22 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗  
+𝛼23𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 +  𝛼24𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖 +
 𝛼25𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖(𝑘−1) +  𝛼26𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑘 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡2𝑗 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑘                                                       (5) 
where 𝛼1𝑚(𝑚 = 0 … 7) in Equation (4) and 𝛼2𝑚(𝑚 =
0 … 5) in Equation (5) represents the coefficients of the 
variables. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡1,2𝑗  is the coefficient for the fixed 
effects of the contest j, and j represents the kth contest 
that solver i has participated in. 
Table 5a summarizes the results of the seemingly 
unrelated regression of Equation (4) and (5) where the 
quantity of help given is used as the main independent 
variable. After accounting for competitive intensity, 
the direct effect of the quantity of help given on 
performance is positive and significant in both Model 
3 (α11 = 224.81, p < 0.01) and Model 4 (α11 = 295.26, p 
< 0.01). Moreover, the interaction effect of the quantity 
of help given and competitive intensity on performance 
is negative and significant in both Model 3 (α13 = -
225.83, p < 0.01) and Model 4 (α13 = -299.11, p < 0.01). 
Thus, when competitive intensity is low (i.e., when 
competitive intensity is closer to 0), the overall effect 
of help given on performance could be positive. 
However, this positive effect of quantity of help given 
on contest performance weakens and may even flip as 
the competitive intensity increases (i.e., when 
competitive intensity gets closer to 1). Thus, H4a is 
supported. 
The interaction effect of the quantity of help given and 
competitive intensity on help received is positive and 
significant in both Model 3 (α22 = 0.62, p < 0.01) and 
Model 4 (α22 = 1.31, p < 0.01), while the direct effect 
of quantity of help given on help received is negative 
and significant in both Model 3 (α21 = -0.39, p < 0.01) 
and Model 4 (α21 = -1.05, p < 0.01). This suggests that 
the overall effect of help given on help received would 
be more positive in highly competitive contests, 
whereas it would be less positive in contests where the 
level of competition is low. Thus, H5a is supported. 
We mean-centered the variables to reduce any 
collinearity effects arising from the introduction of 
interaction terms. 
Alternatively, we used the quality of help given as the 
main independent variable and reestimated the models 
(Table 5b). Consistent with the previous results with 
the quantity of help given, the direct effect of quality of 
help given on performance is positive and significant 
in both Model 3 (α11 = 1750, p < 0.01) and Model 4 
(α11 = 1674, p < 0.01), while the interaction effect of 
quality of help given and competitive intensity on 
performance is negative and significant in both Model 
3 (α13 = -1759, p < 0.01) and Model 4 (α13 = -1683, p < 
0.01). Thus, H4b is supported. Moreover, the 
interaction effect of the quality of help given and 
competitive intensity on help received is not 
significant. Thus, H5b is not supported. Table 6 
provides a summary of the results. 
We plotted these interaction effects for three levels of 
competitive intensity for quantity (Figure 6a) and 
quality (Figure 6b) of help given. We fixed 
competitive intensity at the 10th percentile (low), 50th 
percentile (medium), and 90th percentile (high). The 
interaction plots show that both quantity and quality of 
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help given are related to better performance when 
competitive intensity is low, while they result in poorer 
performance when competitive intensity is high. Our 
results also show that the quantity of help given 
enhances the quantity of help received when 
competitive intensity is high. 
Additionally, we used a bootstrap method to analyze 
the impact of help given on performance and help at 
different levels of competitive intensity (H4). Given 
Equation (4), we can write the following partial 
derivative to estimate the effect of help given on 
performance (Equation 6): 
𝜕𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝜕𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛
= ?̂?11 + ?̂?13𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (6) 
Where ?̂?11  shows the direct impact of help given on 
performance. We also expect help given to have an 
indirect impact on performance (?̂?13), depending on 
the level of competitive intensity. To further evaluate 
these effects, we estimated the help given effect on 
performance at various percentiles of competitive 
intensity (i.e., 90th, 50th, and 10th), where lower 
percentiles represent contests that are less competitive. 
We computed standard errors using a bootstrapping 
method introduced by Efron (1979). Table 7 shows the 
effect of quantity and quality of help given on 
performance. 
As the results indicate, competitive intensity 
negatively moderates the relationship between help 
given and performance. In other words, solvers get 
more performance benefits through sharing knowledge 
in less competitive contests rather than in high- 
competitive contests. 
 
Table 5a. SUR Results for Help Quantity with Competitive Intensity Moderation 
DV 
Help received Contest performance 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
Help given (quantity) -0.3926 *** -1.0540 ***     224.8094 ***    295.2586 *** 
Help received     8.8262 ***  8.2645 *** 
Competition* HG.  0.6200 ***  1.3143 ***     -225.8285 ***   -299.1137 *** 
Contest performance(k-1)  -0.0000   0.0702 *** 
Submissions       2.4610 ***  2.6890 *** 
Skill  0.0249 ***  0.0395 ***         37.8835 ***       41.5588 *** 
Tenure  0.0244 **  0.0280   -4.0862 12.5865 *** 
Observations  31693  13082     31693 13082 
R-squared  0.1480  0.1424    0.4350  0.4568 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 5b. SUR Results for Help Quality with Competitive Intensity Moderation 
DV 
Help received Contest performance 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
Help given (quality)  0.0853    0.0529  1750.0470 ***  1673.9720 *** 
Help received          5.2953 ***        3.1151 * 
Competition* HP.       0.1008   0.1329 -1759.7940 *** -1683.0620 *** 
Contest performance(k-1)    0.0000         0.0622 *** 
Submissions          2.2911 ***        2.4103 *** 
Skill   0.0440 ***   0.0655 ***      35.2127 ***      38.0116 *** 
Tenure   0.0286 ***   0.0350 *       -6.6361 **      10.2198 ** 
Observations 31693 13082     31693     13082 
R-squared 0.0726 0.0721     0.4603     0.4896 
Notes:*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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H1a: Help given (quantity) → Performance (+) 4a (+) Supported 
H1b: Help given (quality) → Performance (+) 4b (+) Supported 
H2a: Help given (quantity) → Help received (+) 4a (+) Supported 
H2b: Help given (quality) → Help received (+) 4b (+) Supported 
H3a: Help received (quantity) → Performance (+) 4a (+) Supported 
H3b: Help received (quality) → Performance (+) 4b (+) Supported 
H4a: Competition moderation of H1a (-) 5a (-) Supported 
H4b: Competition moderation of H1b (-) 5b (-) Supported 
H5a: Competition moderation of H2a (+) 5a (+) Supported 
H5b: Competition moderation of H2b (+) 5b n.s. Not Supported 
Notes: (+) positive relationship; (-) negative relationship; n.s. nonsignificant relationship  
  
Figure 6a. Interaction Plots of Competitive Intensity (Quantity Help) 
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Table 7. Competition Moderation of Help Given and Performance Results 
Competitive intensity Quantity of help given impact Quality of help given impact 
90th percentile 0.629 3.100 
50th percentile        4.310 ***       31.784 *** 
10th percentile      20.389 ***     157.082 *** 
Observations                    31693                    31693 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
4.3 Additional Analysis: 
Motivated by the works of Faraj et al. (2015), we 
conducted additional analyses to deepen our 
understanding of: (1) the differential effects of the 
nature of knowledge shared, and (2) the effect of 
structural social capital on the extent of help received. 
In addition, we also tested our model for potential 
reverse causality effect. 
4.3.1 Effects of Knowledge Type 
In order to have a clear understanding of the nature of 
knowledge being shared on these forums, we 
conducted a topic analysis of the messages posted by 
users. We combined all the posts for each user and then 
identified 200 topics, which were categorized into two 
broad groups: technical knowledge and context 
clarification knowledge. Technical knowledge 
includes discussions directly related to technical 
aspects of solution design. For instance, discussions 
about algorithms, programming codes, and 
statistical/predictive models and methods were evident 
in the messages. Some common keywords in the 
“technical knowledge” category were neural networks, 
logistic regression, markov chain, algorithm, matlab, 
python, java, json, correlations, and matrix. The 
“context clarification” category included general 
questions related to context, platform, and data. Some 
common keywords in this category were team, 
leaderboard, rules, submission, variables, and other 
keywords directly related to project-specific topics and 
variables (e.g., hospital, days-in-hospital, claim, csv, 
and data.). We also identified the top five contributors 
to each topic. Out of the sample of 923 users, 49% 
contributed only technical knowledge, 48% 
contributed only context clarification knowledge, and 
3% contributed both technical and context clarification 
knowledge.  
Tables 8a, 8b, 9a, and 9b show the effects of the 
quantity and quality of technical and context-
clarification knowledge sharing on performance 
outcomes, respectively. Overall, our results show that 
solvers who contribute either type of knowledge 
(technical or context clarification) in any form 
(quantity or quality) are likely to have their sharing 
reciprocated. Furthermore, our results suggest that the 
quantity of contextual help given is more likely to 
impact performance through reciprocated help (i.e., 
help received). As for technical help rendered, both 
quantity and quality are likely to directly impact 
performance. Not surprisingly, solvers who share 
knowledge in a less competitive contest likely achieve 
more performance gains than those who share 
knowledge in a very highly competitive contest. 
Sharing technical knowledge (both quantity and 
quality) in a highly competitive contest can have a less 
positive or an adverse impact on solvers’ overall 
performance. A plausible explanation for this is that 
other competitors may be able to exploit the technical 
knowledge that has been shared, thus engendering a 
knowledge spillover effect. Therefore, solvers must be 
mindful when they share technical knowledge in 
extremely competitive contests. 
The model controlled for contest-specific effects. It 
should be noted that solvers who contributed both 
technical and context-clarification knowledge were not 
included in the analysis. Thus, the results cannot be 
compared with the main analysis. The purpose of this 
analysis is mainly to provide some additional insight 
into the effects of the type of knowledge being shared. 
Table 8a. SUR Results for Help Quantity (Technical Knowledge) 
DV 
Help received Contest performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Help given (quantity)  0.123 ***  3.928 ***   6.431 ** 1556.958 *** 
Help received     8.247      -0.317 
Competition* HP.  -3.902 ***  -1589.073 *** 
Contest performance(k-1) -0.000 -0.000  0.044 **        0.047 ** 
Submissions     3.028 ***        3.271 *** 
Skill  0.060  0.056 33.828 ***      31.753 *** 
Tenure -0.052 -0.055 38.459 **      36.858 ** 
Observations   1019   1019   1019        1019 
R-Squared   0.176   0.193   0.667        0.688 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 8b. SUR Results for Help Quantity (Context Knowledge) 
DV 
Help Received Contest Performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Help given (quantity)  0.103 ***  0.531 ***   2.364 -49.528 
Help received   23.420 **  24.482 ** 
Competition* HP.  -0.458 **   55.496 
Contest performance(k-1)  0.000 *  0.000 ** -0.005   -0.006 
Submissions    4.112 ***    4.039 *** 
Skill  0.024  0.033       21.754 **  20.819 ** 
Tenure -0.039 -0.031 13.826   12.615 
Observations   592   592   592    592 
R-Squared  0.405  0.410 0.710   0.710 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 9a. SUR for Help Quality (Technical Knowledge) 
DV 
Help Received Contest Performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Help given (quality)  0.065 *** -0.650 24.718 ***  1974.320 *** 
Help received     7.458        8.677 
Competition* HP.    0.730  -1989.885 *** 
Contest performance(k-1) -0.000 -0.000   0.039 *        0.037 * 
Submissions     2.742 ***        2.761 *** 
Skill  0.065   0.064 29.991 ***      31.390 *** 
Tenure -0.058 -0.056 35.601 *      30.326 * 
Observations  1019  1019  1019        1019 
R-Squared  0.100  0.101  0.681       0.703 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 9b. SUR for Help Quality (Context Knowledge) 
DV 
Help Received Contest Performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Help given (quality)  0.087 ***   8.156 ** 41.046 ***  1657.077 *** 
Help received   21.834 **      15.139 
Competition* HP.   -8.295 ***  -1660.854 *** 
Contest performance(k-1)  0.000   0.000 -0.004       -0.003 
Submissions    3.537 ***        3.611 *** 
Skill  0.101 ***   0.101 *** 21.179 **      21.416 ** 
Tenure -0.001   0.004 10.344      11.679 
Observations   592    592    592        592 
R-Squared  0.253   0.277   0.725        0.731 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 10a. OLS Regression Results (Social Capital in Help-Seeking Network) 
DV Betweenness centrality Degree centrality 
Help given (quality) 24.7144 ***  0.7044 ***  
Help given (quantity)  27.1980 ***  0.7949 *** 
Number of contests 23.5470 ***   6.9962 *** 0.4709 *** 0.7732 *** 
R-squared   0.2132    0.4488 0.7453 0.4862 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 10b. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression (Indegree) 
DV Help received (quantity) Help received (quality) 
In-degree  0.0507 *** 0.0430 *** 
Number of contests  0.0288 *** 0.0356 *** 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 10c. OLS Regression (Performance) 
DV Overall performance 
Betweenness     1.83 *** 
In-degree 128.50 *** 
Out-degree   70.52 * 
Number of contests            1427.14 *** 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
4.3.2 Effects of Help Given on Help-Seeking 
Network 
To further explore how help given influences the 
contributor’s performance through help received, we 
analyzed the help-seeking network of users by taking 
into account the overall crowdsourcing platform (pool 
data). In this network, a directed edge between users 
A and B (A → B) exists if B responds to A’s request 
for help. In other words, the directed edge from A to 
B implies that A receives help from B. The results (see 
Table 10a) show that structural social capital accrues 
to those who share knowledge, eventually leading to 
superior overall performance. Following prior 
research, we used betweenness centrality to measure 
structural social capital (Faraj et al., 2015). Solvers 
who appear frequently on the geodesic (i.e., shortest 
path) between other pairs of solvers would enjoy the 
benefits of betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1979). 
Such solvers generally bridge otherwise isolated 
solvers and/or networks of solvers, thus being 
positionally privileged in terms of access to and 
control of information (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 
2013). In their articulation of various network 
measures of social capital, Borgatti, Jones, and Everett 
(1998) note the positive relation between betweenness 
centrality and social capital. Prior studies have also 
noted that betweenness centrality is highly correlated 
with structural holes (Everett & Borgatti, 2005) and 
that players (i.e., solvers) who bridge structural holes 
perform better (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Consistent with 
theory, our results show that knowledge contribution 
is positively associated with the degree centrality of 
the contributor in the knowledge-seeking network. 
We also tested the relationship between in-degree and 
help received (Table 10b). In our network, high in-
degree (i.e., number of edges coming into a node) 
refers to someone who renders a lot of help. We found 
a positive and significant relationship between in-
degree and help received. In addition, our results show 
a significant positive relationship between centrality 
measures (in-degree & out-degree and betweenness) 
and performance (Table 10c). This further affirms that 
help given leads to performance gains through help 
received (i.e., enhanced structural social capital). 
Since we used directional networks, degree centrality 
was broken down into in-degree and out-degree in the 
performance analysis. 
4.3.3 Correcting for Endogeneity 
Our SUR estimates show a positive and significant 
relationship between the help given and performance 
scores, after controlling for other observed sources of 
performance. The primary challenge in estimating the 
performance impact of help given variables is that 
unobservable solver characteristics (such as innate 
quality or ability, ambition, intelligence, 
industriousness, and level of knowledge and skills) are 
likely to determine both the performance and help 
given. It is reasonable perhaps to expect high 
performers to be more willing to render help to others. 
The unobservable factors are known to the utility-
maximizing solvers but not to others when they make 
their decisions regarding how much help to give. 
Those endowed with skills/innate ability and having 
positive expectations about their performance are 
more likely to give help. In other words, there are 
alternative sources of the relationship between 
performance and help provided to others; solvers 
differ not only in their performance and help provided 
to others but also in a variety of factors. Thus, the 
unobserved common determinants of performance 
and help given would confound the relationship. The 
measurement error can also cause a correlation 
between the error term and help given, particularly if 
there were errors in help given arising from 
misreporting or other reasons.  
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These sources of the endogeneity of help given imply 
that the parameter estimates obtained from the 
equations estimated by OLS and/or SUR are likely to 
be biased and inconsistent, as the disturbance term is 
correlated with help given. Specifically, given the 
existence of these sources of endogeneity, the 
performance impact of help given obtained by OLS or 
SUR will be biased upward if the correlation between 
these unobserved common factors and help given is 
positive because the coefficient of help given would 
not only pick up the performance effect of help given 
but also the hidden effect of the common 
unobservable factors subsumed in the error term that 
determines both performance and help given.  
In light of the preceding discussions, we used an 
instrumental variable method to account for the 
endogeneity of help given. We control for the 
endogeneity of the help given variables by using an 
instrumental variable obtained from the average levels 
of the word counts variable for the other contests j (j≠ 





𝑗=1 ). More specifically, suppose that 
Solver 1 participated in three contests, all with a 
deadline at time t (e.g., 2010). Furthermore, suppose 
that the word counts for these three teams are 
𝑥1,𝑥2, and 𝑥3 , respectively. Then, the level of the 
instrumental variable for Solver 1’s first contest 
would be the mean value of 𝑥2 and  𝑥3. Similarly, for 
Solver 1’s second contest it would be the mean of 
𝑥1 and 𝑥3, and for the third contest it is the average of 
𝑥1 and 𝑥2. Word for word, instead of using the word 
count from the current observation itself, we used the 
mean of word counts computed using all observations 
for the solver except the one from the current 
observation at time t.  
The validity of this instrumental variable hinges on the 
view that the average word counts will not affect the 
focal solver’s performance directly but will affect it 
indirectly through its impact on the help given 
variables. Given this, we expect this instrument to be 
strongly related to help given but not correlated with 
the error terms of the outcome equations. Since these 
averages are for the other contests that solver i has 
participated in, they are relevant (i.e., they are 
correlated with the endogenous variable help given). 
The average word count variable is also arguably 
uncorrelated with the error term in the estimating 
equation for solver i’s k focal contest, as it is the 
average of the other contests in which a solver 
participated (i.e., they are unaffected by idiosyncratic 
factors of solver i’s focal contest). Thus, under the 
condition that average word count affects 
performance only through help given, as required for 
a valid instrument, we employed an instrumental 
variable approach to examine the performance impact 
of help given.  
To test the assumption that the average word count 
variable should only indirectly affect performance 
through help given, we ran performance on average 
word count, help given, and the exogenous variables. 
The results reveal that there is not a significant 
(statistically or economically) relationship between 
average word count and performance. The coefficient 
of average word count in these regressions is almost 
zero and statistically insignificant, indicating that 
average word count variable only indirectly affects 
performance.  
We also tested the instrument relevance and 
exogeneity assumptions separately. The first stage 
regressions show that the instrument has a very strong 
impact on both quantity and quality of help given, 
indicating it is a strong or relevant instrument. 
Specifically, the t-stat for the coefficient on the 
instrumental variable in the quality of help given 
equation is 43.36 (3.3 or higher indicates that the 
instruments are relevant) and the t-stat for the 
coefficient on the instrumental variable in the quantity 
of help equation is 126.73 (3.3 or higher indicates that 
the instruments are relevant).  
Since we only used one instrument, we were not able 
to perform an overidentification test (Sargan or 
Hansen J) because our model is exactly identified, 
resulting in a degree of freedom of zero. As discussed 
above, it is intuitive to argue that average word count 
would only affect the focal solver’s performance 
indirectly through its impact on help given, but not 
directly. Thus, the instrument is both relevant and 
exogenous, indicating that it is valid. We summarize 
the results for quantity and quality of help given (with 
and without the interaction of competitive intensity) 
in Table 11a and Table 11b, respectively. The results 
generally support our main hypotheses.8 
In order to perform the overidentification test to 
evaluate whether the instrument correlates with the 
error term and to check the robustness of the results, 
we also employed a recently advocated moment-based 
instrumental variable (IV) method (See Lewbel, 
2012). The moment-based IV estimator exploits 
heteroscedasticity in the error term from the first-stage 
regressions (e.g., regressions of the help given 
variables to exogenous covariates), to control for the 
endogeneity even in the absence of exclusion 
restrictions. We employed this approach for the model 
without the interaction term. The results are illustrated 
in Table 11c. 
 
8  We also estimated our models using three-stage least 
squares (3SLS). The results were almost identical. 
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Table 11a. 2SLS Results for Help Quantity  
 (1) (2) 
DV: Performance IV IV_INT 
Help given 8.3213*** 430.9076*** 
Competition*HG  -449.8108*** 
Help received 5.3982*** 11.0044*** 
Submission 2.0345*** 2.2802*** 
Performance0 0.3448*** 0.3425*** 
Tenure -12.8972*** -11.1847*** 
Skill 21.5331*** 22.6050*** 
Constant 1,018.6650*** 1,017.0392*** 
Observations 31,693 31,693 
R-squared 0.5122 0.5099 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 11b. 2SLS Results for Help Quality 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Performance IV IV_INT 
Help given 27.4911*** 5,564.8836*** 
Competition*HG  -5,703.0788*** 
Help received 2.7701 13.3709*** 
Submission 1.8907*** 2.4746*** 
Performance0 0.3400*** 0.3230*** 
Tenure -14.0686*** -12.9814*** 
Skill 20.3956*** 20.7245*** 
Constant 1,031.8367*** 1,056.9965*** 
Observations 31,693 31,693 
R-squared 0.5203 0.4233 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 11c. 2SLS with Moment-based Instrumental Variable Method 






Help given 10.6991*** 31.9468*** 
Help received 3.9067 1.4981 
Submission 1.9939*** 1.8444*** 
Tenure -13.0292*** -14.3333*** 
Skill 21.2801*** 20.0677*** 
Performance0 0.3441*** 0.3388*** 
Constant 1,237.0958*** 1,240.1697*** 
Observations 31,693 31,693 
R-squared 0.5119 0.5199 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat 1.6e+04 4.5e+04 
Sargan / Hansen J p-value 0.6338 0.8659 
Notes: We used robust standard errors. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <0.1 
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To employ the Lewbel (2012) method, we specified 
two auxiliary estimating equations: one for the quality 
of help given and one for the quantity of help given. As 
pointed out by Lewbel (2012), the model is identified 
if the error terms in these first-stage regressions are 
heteroscedastic. Explicitly, there should be a 
correlation between some of the exogenous variables 
and the residuals in the first-stage regressions, but 
these variables should not be correlated with the 
covariance between the error terms of these two 
equations and the error term in the second-stage 
equation. According to Lewbel (2012), the residuals 
from the first-stage quality and quantity of help given 
equations multiplied by each of the mean-centered 
exogenous variables would be valid instruments for the 
quality and quantity of help given.  
We used the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test to 
corroborate the existence of the heteroscedasticity in 
the first-stage regressions. We then multiplied the 
residuals from the auxiliary equations and the mean-
centered submission, tenure, and skill variables as 
additional instruments. As illustrated in Table 11c, the 
results from the test of overidentifying restrictions (the 
Sargan or Hansen J test), employed to test for 
correlation between instruments and error term, justify 
the use of these additional instruments (i.e., the p-value 
is greater than 0.10, failing to reject the presence of 
instrument exogeneity). 
In summary, we first used the average word count 
variable as an instrument for help given and estimated 
our model by employing the two-stage least squares 
method to causally identify the performance impact of 
help given. We believe that this instrument is 
intuitively both strong and exogenous. Furthermore, 
we also employed the moment-based IV method to 
conduct the test of overidentifying restrictions and 
checked the robustness of our results. All of our 
regressions also include competition-fixed effects that 
helped us rule out the likelihood that differences in 
competition-specific unobservable factors drove the 
relationship between performance and help given.  
It is also likely that the solver performance is 
persistent, which can stem from solver heterogeneity 
or state dependence. In order to control the confluence 
of persistence in user performance, we included the 
initial performance of solvers (the average of the 
performance of each user in the first year they 
participated in a contest), which can control for the 
unobserved factors that remain relatively stable over 
time across solvers, such as attitude toward helping 
others. The inclusion of this variable is needed to 
control for the potential serial correlation. It is likely 
that the current levels of performance are a function of 
lagged levels of performance. This variable, however, 
may be endogenous as well (although in this analysis 
we include the initial levels of the performance, not the 
lagged levels by one period, which is less susceptive to 
endogeneity). Thus, we also ran our models without 
including the initial levels of performance in our 
regressions. The coefficients of the main variables of 
interest still had the expected magnitude and 
significance. 
4.4 Additional Robustness Tests 
In addition to the above main results and additional 
analyses, we also conducted various supplementary 
tests using alternative measures and methods. All these 
checks consistently demonstrated that the results are 
robust. 
First, we retested our main model including individual-
level fixed effects. Individual-fixed effects account for 
the heterogeneity of solvers and help control for 
endogeneity issues that arise because of solver traits 
and other unobservable variables. In other words, we 
study the effect of a given solver (with the same skill 
and individual characteristics) participating in multiple 
projects with differing competitive intensity. 
Equations (7) and (8) describe the regression model 
with individual-fixed effects. Results are summarized 
in Tables 12a and 12b.  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑘   = 𝛼11 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘  +
𝛼12𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑘 +  
𝛼13 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗 +
𝛼14𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗 +  𝛼15𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑘 +
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡1𝑗 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑘                                     (7) 
 
𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑘   = 𝛼21 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘 + 
𝛼22 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝_𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑘 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗  
+ 𝛼23 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗 + 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡2𝑗 +
𝜀2𝑖𝑘                                                                            (8) 
As expected, competitive intensity negatively 
moderates the effect of both quantity (α13 = -380.62, p 
< 0.01) and quality (α13 = -1657.59, p < 0.01) of help 
given on performance. Moreover, competitive 
intensity positively moderates the effect of quantity 
(α13 = 1.18, p < 0.01) of help given on help received. 
Therefore, the results are robust when controlling for 
individual-specific effects.  
Second, we separately investigated the effects of 
quantity and quality of help given on quantity and 
quality of help received. Table 13 summarizes these 
results. The results show that both quantity and quality 
of help given increased the quantity and quality of help 
received and improved contest performance. 
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Table 12a. SUR Results for Help Quantity with Individual-Fixed Effects 
DV Help received Contest performance 
Help given (quantity) -0.9095 ***   375.1905 ***  
Help received    6.3164 *** 
Competition* HG. 1.1785 *** -380.6183 *** 
Submissions    3.7365 *** 
Sample size 8559 8559 
   
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 We only considered individuals who have participated in at least five 
contests due to limitation of handling too many variables. 
Table 12b. SUR Results for Help Quality with Individual-Fixed Effects 
DV Help received Contest performance 
Help given (quality) -0.2226  1645.4020 ***  
Help received         4.1167 * 
Competition* HG.  0.3772 -1657.5860 *** 
Submissions         3.3628 *** 
Sample size  8559         8559 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 We only considered individuals who have participated in at least five 
contests due to limitation of handling too many variables. 
Table 13. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Quantity and Quality Help Received) 
DV 
Help received Contest performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Help given 
(quantity) 
0.799 *** 0.404 ***      9.232 *** 10.209 ***   
Help given 
(quality) 
  0.605 *** 0.497 ***   30.260 *** 30.818 *** 
Help received 
(quantity) 
      2.332 ***    1.864 ***  
Help received 
(quality) 
       2.219 ***    1.093 ** 
Submissions       2.400***   2.393 ***   2.228 ***   2.245 *** 
Skill 0.067 *** 0.086 *** 0.159 *** 0.105 *** 37.809 *** 37.795 *** 36.255 *** 36.386 *** 
Tenure 0.060 * 0.095 ** 0.079 ** 0.091 *** -4.648 *  -4.725 * -6.128 ** -6.069 ** 
Sample size 31693 31693 31693 31693  31693   31693  31693  31693 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
5 Discussion 
With the rapid development of crowdsourcing 
technologies and practices, more data are continuously 
becoming available to researchers, affording them an 
opportunity to empirically investigate design and 
managerial issues in crowdsourcing. This study takes 
an important step in this direction by examining how 
helping behavior affects solver performance and 
reciprocal benefits in crowdsourcing communities. 
The primary motivation for this study was to 
investigate how solvers benefit from sharing 
information and knowledge in contest forums. We 
found that solvers gained reciprocal benefits by 
helping others, which, in turn, contributed to 
performance gains. However, the impact on 
performance of helping others may not be 
straightforward, for it may be contingent on the 
environment. While rendering help to peers in 
collaborative environments may positively influence 
performance, in competitive environments, our results 
suggested a weaker positive effect on performance. 
Indeed, in an extremely competitive contest, helping 
behaviors may result in knowledge spillover that could 
adversely affect performance. Our results also suggest 
a significant moderating effect of competitive intensity 
on the relationship between the quantity of help given 
and help received. 
Helping Others in Crowdsourcing Communities  
 
90 
We also found that help received has a significant and 
positive relationship with performance. Furthermore, 
in our study, help received partially mediated the 
positive effect of help given on contest performance. 
Our analysis of the help-seeking network underlying a 
coopetitive crowdsourcing environment shows that 
social capital accrues to those who render help, which, 
in turn, helps to improve their overall performance. 
In order to provide a deeper understanding of the 
nature of knowledge shared, we performed a text 
analysis of users’ posts on the discussion forum and 
identified two broad categories of knowledge: namely, 
technical and context clarification. Our results suggest 
that, compared to the quantity of context clarification 
knowledge shared, the quantity of technical knowledge 
shared has a greater impact on performance.  
Furthermore, to check whether high-skill solvers are 
likely to withhold their knowledge in highly 
competitive contests, we plotted percentile shares of 
quantity and quality of help given against competitive 
intensity (see Appendix B). Our results do not reveal 
evidence of such behavior. Based on the plots, low-
skill solvers are more inclined to share knowledge 
(quantity) in less competitive contests. 
Our study utilized a unique dataset from Kaggle, a 
leading predictive analytics contest community. The 
data afforded us objective measures of help given, help 
received, and contest performance on every participant 
in a given contest over a period of time. This rich 
dataset allowed us to control for individuals’ 
persistency and contest heterogeneity in estimating the 
effects of help given by the contributor. 
5.1 Theoretical Implications  
This study offers several theoretical contributions. 
First, the findings of this study extend the boundaries 
of the extant literature on knowledge sharing in online 
and collaborative communities to include the dynamics 
of helping behaviors in a coopetitive environment. 
Specifically, our study contributes to the growing 
literature on prosocial behaviors in online 
communities. We examine such behaviors in the 
context of a crowdsourcing environment in which 
cooperation and competition simultaneously exist. 
Prior research has focused largely on collaborative 
communities (Huang & Zhang, 2016) and the 
motivation for members to participate in such 
communities (Wasko & Faraj, 2005). Furthermore, 
past studies, for the most part, implicitly assume that 
benefits accrue to those who share. By elucidating the 
dynamics of knowledge sharing (i.e., help given, help 
received, and performance) in such coopetitive 
settings, our study makes a valuable contribution to the 
extant literature. Our study theorizes and clarifies the 
actual benefits of community contributions. We 
empirically demonstrate that helping behavior in 
coopetitive communities does have an important effect 
on contest performance as well as on the help that one 
receives. 
Second, we demonstrate the enduring value of social 
exchange theory in explaining knowledge sharing 
behavior in a coopetitive environment. Although social 
exchange theory explains the dual effects (costs and 
benefits) of social exchanges, it has rarely been applied 
in the same context to understand the overall impact of 
these dual forces. Prior studies have mainly focused on 
the benefits of social exchanges. For example, earlier 
studies suggest that prosocial behavior benefits 
contributors in noncompetitive environments (Grant & 
Sonnentag, 2010; Sproull et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2009). 
We have not only applied the theory in a new 
coopetitive context to study the dual effect but have 
also used the same context to study how the effects 
vary according to the intensity of the competition. 
Specifically, we extend the boundaries of existing 
knowledge by demonstrating that rendering help in 
less competitive settings enhances performance, 
whereas the potential cost of time and effort in sharing 
knowledge in settings characterized by very high 
levels of competition could be unfavorable to 
performance. 
Third, our additional analyses also shed light on the 
impact of structural social capital in coopetitive 
settings. Previous studies have demonstrated the 
positive impact of structural social capital 
(operationalized as degree centrality in Wasko & Faraj, 
2005) and as betweenness centrality in Faraj et al., 
2015) on knowledge sharing (Wasko & Faraj, 2005) 
and leadership roles (Faraj et al., 2015) in online 
communities. Our study affirms the positive impact of 
both degree and betweenness centrality in a coopetitive 
setting that is quite different from the one used in 
previous research. 
Finally, our research also contributes to coopetitive 
knowledge sharing literature in interorganizational 
settings (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Ritala, 2012) by 
extending it to a completely different context—an 
online crowdsourcing community. The nature of 
coopetition is very different in online crowdsourcing 
communities, compared to interorganizational settings 
where knowledge sharing often happens between two 
rival organizations. The knowledge shared in such 
cases is not available to anyone other than the two 
parties involved in the process. Thus, the probability of 
knowledge spillover is minimal. In crowdsourcing 
contest setting, on the other hand, shared knowledge is 
available to all the competing solvers, thereby 
increasing the chances of knowledge spillover. 
5.2 Practical Implications  
Our findings have strong implications for the design of 
crowdsourcing platforms as well as for the participants 
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who engage in crowdsourcing competitions. Since the 
goal of crowdsourcing sites such as the one we studied 
(i.e., Kaggle) is to help organizations, researchers, and 
the general public find innovative and effective 
solutions to their challenging problems, it is imperative 
that the designers of such platforms foster a climate 
that encourages the exchange of ideas and knowledge. 
It is, therefore, important for them to understand both 
the motivations of participants to share knowledge and 
the effects or consequences of doing so. Our study 
provides insight into help-giving and help-receiving 
behaviors and their relationships with performance. 
Further, we clarify how the intensity of competition 
may affect these dynamics. Specifically, under 
conditions of low competitive intensity solvers will 
benefit from helping others. Understandably, some 
solvers may be hesitant to share knowledge in highly 
competitive environments because of the possibility of 
being outperformed by others who may benefit from 
the knowledge that is shared. Platform providers 
should use different techniques to motivate solvers to 
share knowledge in such environments. For example, 
platforms could introduce reward systems that take 
into account not only the frequency of knowledge 
contributions but also other factors such as quality of 
the contribution, knowledge type (e.g., context 
clarification vs. technical), and the level of 
competition. A solver takes much higher risks by 
sharing technical knowledge in an extremely 
competitive contest and is thus worthy of a higher 
reward than one who shares context clarification 
knowledge in a less competitive contest. On the 
positive side, helping others in highly competitive 
environments is more likely to be reciprocated. 
In summary, our study shows that help giving has an 
impact on help receiving (i.e., reciprocity) and that the 
latter has a positive impact on performance. The 
upshot is that a platform that is conducive to the 
exchange of ideas and information can, in general, 
enhance the performance of participants, thereby 
leading to several benefits, including superior 
solutions to the problem at hand. Furthermore, 
designers of these platforms should find ways (for 
example, through gamification) or develop rules to 
motivate and engage participants so that they are more 
inclined to share their knowledge (e.g., Khansa et al., 
2015) and form valuable ties with other members. 
Incorporating gaming elements (Simões, Redondo, & 
Vilas, 2013) such as rewards for sharing knowledge, 
leaderboards that display the top contributors of ideas, 
and formal recognition of those who helped the 
ultimate winner are examples of some of the things that 
designers could do to motivate even the most reticent 
of participants to share their knowledge.  
Our results suggest that individuals can enhance their 
social and intellectual capital and increase their 
performance by actively engaging in information and 
knowledge sharing in online crowdsourcing 
communities. The social capital that accrues to those 
who share knowledge in such environments may 
confer several benefits on them, including increased 
reciprocity, opportunities for new ideas, and the 
potential for cultivating ties that could be useful in 
other situations (i.e., “appropriability”). 
Our findings also have broader implications for how 
knowledge is shared in other online and virtual 
communities. In organizational settings, project 
managers may also apply these insights to enhance the 
performance of individuals on their work teams. A key 
insight that our study offers is that knowledge sharing 
is beneficial to both collaborating and competing work 
teams. For instance, managers could facilitate 
technology-mediated knowledge and information 
sharing in inter- and intradepartmental work teams. 
Thus, our study has strong implications for both theory 
and practice. 
6 Conclusion and Future Studies 
In a hypercompetitive business environment where 
agility is paramount and the strategic advantage that 
organizations enjoy is fleeting, it is essential for firms 
to continually innovate to offer superior, differentiated 
products/services. At the heart of this imperative is the 
ability of companies to offer personalized and/or 
customized products/services based on keen insights 
derived from data. Data analytics, in general, and 
predictive modeling/analytics, in particular, are crucial 
in these endeavors. Given that there is an acute 
shortage of analytics talent and that many 
organizations lack the resources and/or capabilities to 
harness the enormous potential of data, companies 
often rely on crowdsourcing platforms to provide 
actionable insights. The contests on these platforms are 
intense, and knowledge and expertise can separate the 
winner(s) from the rest. It would seem to be a 
contradiction then that participants would be willing to 
expend time and effort to share ideas and knowledge 
with their rivals when doing so could hurt their chances 
of winning. Given the importance of understanding 
knowledge sharing under such coopetitive conditions, 
it is surprising that there is little or no theoretically 
grounded, empirical research that elucidates this 
phenomenon. Our study expressly addresses this 
concern and represents a small but important step 
towards clarifying the dynamics of knowledge sharing 
in coopetitive environments. 
As outlined in the implications section, our research 
has strong implications for both theory and practice. In 
summary, our findings suggest that: (1) rendering help 
can increase the likelihood of receiving help; (2) the 
extent of help received can positively influence 
performance; (3) competitors who help others in a 
highly competitive contest, as opposed to one with low 
competitive intensity, are more likely to receive help, 
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but are less likely to see an improvement in their 
performance; (4) help received partially mediates the 
relationship between help given and performance; and 
(5) consistent with prior studies, structural social 
capital—measured in terms of degree and betweenness 
centrality—has a positive impact on knowledge 
sharing behaviors. Thus, our study makes a valuable 
contribution to the existing literature and provides 
insight to academics and practitioners alike. 
As with many other empirical studies, this study has 
some limitations that future research could address. 
However, we believe these limitations are minor and 
do not detract from our contributions in any major way. 
First, our study is based on data from a data 
mining/predictive modeling crowdsourcing website. It 
would be useful to generalize our study to other types 
of crowdsourcing communities. Second, our data only 
include information that is publicly available on the 
website. Passive participation or “lurking” could 
improve the intellectual performance of individual 
participants in the community. However, this is not 
visible to researchers. Thus, we encourage further 
investigation of helping behaviors using additional 
methods such as follow-up surveys. Third, we 
measured help received (by a solver) according to the 
number of forum replies to a question posed in a thread 
initiated by the solver. It is conceivable that some of 
the forum responses may be to related questions asked 
by solvers while responding to the original question, 
and may, therefore, inflate the help received count. 
Fourth, while our study provides some evidence of the 
long-term effects of knowledge contributions, it would 
be interesting to further investigate the consequences 
of the effects of help given that go beyond help 
received and performance. 
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Table A1. Topic Analysis 










































knowledge management sharing organizational organizations 
technology factors framework analysis organization characteristics 




 ☐ ☐ 
network firms knowledge networks capabilities market firm business 
role structure exchange competition competitive resources ties 
industries units cooperation view transformation 
Firm networks (competitive, 
cooperation) 
  ☐ 
motivation intention intrinsic extrinsic altruism selfefficacy 
motivations factors rewards contributors recipients reward satisfaction 
injustice enjoyment justice contextual helping levels lurkers 
Motives and intentions (altruism, 
enjoyment) 
 ☐ ☐ 
outsourcing barriers district industrial success strategies relationships 
perspectives assimilation protection closely aspects vcops ipr 
realworld local contingency positions productivity smos 
Outsourcing  ☐ ☐ 
practices objects boundary activities saas brokering requirements 
activity service release projects shared strategies boundaries software 
trust indepth dynamics coworkers customers 
Customer service (cocreation)  ☐ ☐ 
social users information media capital snss creativity facebook 
creative status sites bookmarking contributions attacks security 
capabilities data engagement survey library 
Social Media  ☐ ☐ 
software oss developers project source open projects network firms 
community participants development work openness externalities 
formal strategic production model volunteer 
Open source software 
development 
 ☐ ☐ 
systems public framework health web architectural infrastructure 
architecture development pair models data einnovation configuration 
highlevel services cqa files solo mining 
Healthcare and software-
development (pair, solo) 
 ☐ ☐ 
development software process knowledge learning system processes 
companies systems engineering tools integration time information 
work exchange concepts networks explicit task 
Software development 
(exchange, integration) 
 ☐ ☐ 
information engine users travel inferior agents service share 
knowledgesharing superior answer internet people market competition 
database mobile answers quality engines 
Knowledge sharing services 
(search engines) 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
public behaviour organizations sector brand share consumers 
consumer cost specific capability costs behaviours employees 
involvement malaysian iwe moderating innovativeness practitioners 
Public sector organizations and 
brand communities 
 ☐ ☐ 
cops group transfer groups efficiency organization experience status 
consortia participants agricultural benchmarking department cop agile 
private consulting productivity icts corporate 
Communities of practice  ☐ ☐ 
community virtual communities online members social users 
participation interaction contribution reciprocity information behavior 
quality vcs attitudes professional learning internet understanding 
Virtual communities  ☐ ☐ 
online analysis forum content core members structures specification 
map communication usage debate distributed providers time 
community innovative als farmers expert 
Online communities (forum)  ☐ ☐ 
Helping Others in Crowdsourcing Communities  
 
98 
knowledge sharing social model trust effect theory data members 
factors influence relationship perceived individuals theoretical 
knowledgesharing behaviors practical behavior positive 
Motives and intentions (e.g. 
trust, perceived expertise, 
perceived relative advantages, 
perceived ease of use, perceived 
credibility) 
 ☐ ☐ 
competition learning cooperation cooperative coopetition competitive 
model firms alliances advantage alliance effective simultaneous 
crossfunctional levels task open resource control interorganizational 
Interorganizational/ cross-
functional groups (cooperative, 
coopetition, competitive)  
   
web students identity activities dimensions selfefficacy intention 
seeking expectations knowledgewithholding education 
crossorganizational pressure mechanism extent sites sense ttest 
samples sociability 
Motives and intentions (identity, 
self-efficacy) 
 ☐ ☐ 
communication supply chain strategy collaboration type firm 
leadership tools digital focal features chains professional interviews 
interactive identity interactions supplier view 
Supply chain (collaboration & 
communication) 
 ☐ ☐ 
team teams coordination project activities communication systems 
development competition projects gsd dispersed group collaboration 
isd cultural hrm teamwork distributed global 
Project team (coordination, 
collaboration, competition) 
  ☐ 
innovation open innovations analysis clustering imp governance 
internal concept ideas returns incentives forms approaches closed 
remixing form source networking pci 
Open innovation (private-
collective innovation—PCI) 
 ☐  
  




The percentile shares are based on the proportion of quantity and quality of help given that falls into each percentile 
of competitive intensity. We grouped observation into two groups based on solvers’ skill scores, namely, high skill 
and low skill. Specifically, the top 25% (or above the 75 percentile) of skill scores were considered high-skill solvers, 
while the bottom 75% were regarded as low-skill solvers.   
 
 
Figure B1. Quantity of Help Given by Competitive Intensity (High-Skill Solvers) 
 
Figure B2. Quality of Help Given by Competitive Intensity (High-Skill Solvers) 




Figure B3. Quantity of Help Given by Competitive Intensity (Low-Skill Solvers) 
 
Figure B4. Quality of Help Given by Competitive Intensity (Low-Skill Solvers) 
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